Udvari B. – Voszka É. (eds) 2018: *Challenges in National and International Economic Policies*. University of Szeged, Doctoral School in Economics, Szeged, pp. 13–34.

The internationalisation of the Slovenian state under the Eurozone regime and the crisis of Slovenian exceptionalism

Ana Podvršič

This article studies the institutional changes of Slovenian capitalism that have taken place since the post-2007/2008 crisis by exploring the impact of internationalisation of the Slovenian state apparatuses under the Eurozone regime on the restructuring of Slovenian neo-corporatism. A theoretical framework combining the labour-centred approach to capitalist development, the neo-Poulantzasian debate on neoliberal internationalisation of states and Latin American dependency theory is used. A political economy of the Slovenian institutional dynamics before and after the crisis is proposed. Whereas the importance of external and internal constraints to the post-2008 policy shift has been acknowledged, the rescaling and remodelling of Slovenian state regulations in line with the Eurozone regime and the consequent uneven restructuring of the capacities of various local social forces to influence decision-making process have been underestimated. One should go beyond the dichotomist understanding of institutional change in terms of continuity and change to integrate the question of power relations between social forces and institutions representing them.

Keywords: Slovenia, post-2007/08 crisis, Eurozone, neocorporatism, institutional change

1. Introduction

This contribution examines the changing role of the state in national economies by discussing the institutional changes of Slovenian capitalism that have taken place since the post-2007/2008 crisis. As various accounts point out, the crisis revealed more than some internal weakness in the Slovenian pre-crisis growth regime (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012, Myant–Drahokoupil 2011). By 2010, it also became clear that the country barely resembled a regional social-democratic outlier, as (at least until recently) the widely accepted assertion would have it: a strong erosion of corporatist and democratic policy making (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012, Guardiancich 2012, Krašovec–Johannsen 2016, Stanojević et al. 2016), extreme government instability and the radicalisation of political leaders' agendas with regard to EU policy directives (Bembič 2013, Lindstrom 2015, Stanojević 2014) are some of the characteristics commonly associated with Slovenian policy-making during the crisis. Finally, between 2010 and 2014, substantial structural reforms were implemented, leading scholars to question the future of Slovenian "exceptionalism" (Guardiancich 2016, Lindstrom 2015, Stanojević et al. 2016,). These developments were alternately attributed to the country's reluctance to engage in liberal reforms in the past, and its "oversized" communist heritage (Bugaric–Kuhelj 2015, Guardiancich 2016); the so-called "neoliberal" post-2004 turn of the Janša administration, which impaired neo-corporatist decision-making (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012) as well as to pressures from the EU and financial markets (Stanojević et al. 2016).

This analysis aims to contribute to the existing debate on the post 2007/08 dynamics of Slovenian capitalism by considering the country's membership in the Eurozone and exploring the impact of internationalisation of the Slovenian state apparatuses under the Eurozone regime on the restructuring of Slovenian neo-corporatism. Since the mid-2000s the latter entered a period of significant change, which only accelerated during the crisis. Since 2010, a various set of regulatory packages have been implemented at the European level that further narrowed member states' capacities to manage the crisis politically and economically. By deepening the crisis hardship and transferring the main burden of adjustment on labour social welfare, this regime accelerated the internal reshuffling of Slovenian neo-corporatism, led by internal devaluation constraints.

The argument unfolds in three steps. First, a theoretical framework is proposed. Then, the discussion focuses on the establishment and erosion of a labour-centred neo-corporatism before the crisis. In the last part, political and institutional developments during the crisis are explored.

2. Theoretical background: The labour-focused international political economy and the centre-periphery relations within the EU

Though distancing itself from theoretical underpinnings of the dominant approach on the diversity of post-socialist capitalism(s), the proposed theoretical framework draws from insights highlighted in the debate on the shortcomings of the VoC paradigm. There are three aspects of post-socialist institutional change that an alternative framework should contain: the role of labour within conflictual industrial relations (Crowley–Stanojević 2011, Hardy 2015), the importance of international actors, especially the EU (Bohle–Greskovits 2007, Bluhm 2010), and the dependent form of international integration (Myant–Drahokoupil 2011, Nölke–Vliegenthart 2009). For these reasons, the proposed alternative theoretical framework builds on three perspectives: the labour-centred approach to capitalist development, the neoliberal internationalisation of states and Latin American dependency theory.

2.1. Labour-centred approach to studying institutional change in a capitalist economy

Building on Poulantzas's state theory, Selwyn (2014) highlights that states are not closed "containers" but embody various networks of institutions and agencies, themselves in conflictual relations. State institutions should be understood as outcomes of prior and on-going struggles between labour, capital and state over the organisation of production and redistribution of the produced value. Consequently, the concrete state form and related hierarchy of state apparatuses are inherently precarious (Hirsch–Kannankulam 2010, p. 17). "[T]he state itself is mutable to the extent that struggles by different classes and fractions of capital, and the outcome of these struggles, are constitutive processes in state institutional formation and reproduction" (Selwyn 2011, p. 11).

The role of labour in shaping state institutions should be particularly taken into account as "[i]ndustrial relations is the core battleground in the clash between capital and labour at the very heart of the value creating process that gives capitalism its profits, its dynamism and its inexorable requirement to expand" (Coates 2014, p. 26). Analysing the specificities of trade unions in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, which include Slovenia, it is useful to distinguish between the societal and political power of organized labour. "Societal power rests on such capacities as high trade union density (representativeness), the ability to organize public protests or the ability to sway public opinion. Political power rests on the ability to influence top-level decision-making through corporatist institutions, centralized bargaining, and the practice of social pacts" (Grdešić 2008, p. 145).

The formation, articulation and reshaping of state apparatuses has spatial dimension as well. This is particularly true in the contemporary period when the neoliberal restructuring of capitalist production gave additional impetus to the re-scaling of regulatory mechanisms below and above state level, and reconfigured institutionalised structures of regulation and agency that were set up in a context of post-war Fordism (Brenner 1999, pp. 60–67). The so-called "internationalisation of state" does not imply, however, a diminution of states. Instead, what is at stake is the transformation of "the role of states in making markets and shaping market relationship" (Panitch–Gindin 2012, p. 105) and the creation of "a system of states prepared to follow the neoliberal agenda of economic deregulation, privatization, and securing property." (Hirsch–Kannankulam 2010, p. 26).

The reconfiguration of state apparatuses is also impacted by the fragmentation of world markets and unequal structuration of the international state system. The global process of accumulation could be seen as a result of different and unequal means of national accumulation and regulations, and is based on the possibility of playing one off against the other (Hirsch 2013, p. 77). As Bruszt and Greskovits (2009) highlight, in Latin America's dependency school, Cardoso and Faletto's historical structural approach (1979) is seen as particularly valuable, as it seeks to understand the "variability of the forms of integration on the world markets" (Cardoso 2009 in Bruszt and Greskovits 2009, p. 412) by exploring changing constraints, mechanisms and structures of dependency relations (see also Becker et al. 2015). The development process in central economies structures and dominates the development at the periphery, contributing to different forms of national development. Production taking place in core and periphery takes structurally asymmetrical, yet interdependent and unequal forms and macroeconomic characteristics that are historically determined.

Nevertheless, arguing against the mechanist view of dependency relations defended by Frank (1966), Cardoso and Faletto (1979) do not simply regard dependence as an external variable. Although the limits for manoeuvring are largely set by the world system, the particular internal configuration of a country determines a specific response to the same external events. The composition of the ruling bloc can be much more complex and depends on particular socio-economic structure. External interests can be internalised by peripheral state and civil society, with no explicit external pressure. Therefore, the relationship between the representatives of foreign and national capital can take different forms, from strategic coalitions to partial conflict (Cardoso–Faletto 1979, p. xvi). To contrast Frank's (1966) "development of under-development" thesis, and to emphasize that the forms of dependence are not permanent and that some of them are compatible with local industrialisation, Cardoso (1972, p. 90) introduces the concept of "dependent capitalist development".

2.2. The internationalisation of post-socialist states

The following discussion attempts to outline the main particularities of the internationalisation of post-socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It is widely acknowledged that Washington-based agencies (IMF and WB) and the EU have played prominent roles in the development of capitalism and national states' regulatory regimes in CEE. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, by tightening its financial assistance, the IMF could effectively exercise "hard" power to achieve structural reforms which were part of the Washington Consensus strategy, in particularly in those countries that had "inherited" a considerable debt burden from their socialist regimes.

As far as the EU is concerned, the formal links with post-socialist states developed after 1993 with the so-called Association Agreements. In contrast to the IMF, the efforts of the EU concerned a much broader agenda of political, economic, and institutional changes. Nevertheless, during the accession period, the EU particularly focused on the improvement of the quality of the regulatory framework related to economic policy and organisation, and, by doing so, it indirectly shaped local arrangements in the social area. Moreover, accession to the EU required the elimination of control on the cross-border movement of capital; the countries were required to enter the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and to introduce the European common currency (Myant–Drahokoupil 2011).

Given the fact that Slovenia adopted the euro in 2007, as the first among the EU post-socialist members to enter the Eurozone, EMU regulatory constraints should be considered as well. The EMU regime, codified in the Maastricht Treaty, The Stability and Growth Pact, and the Lisbon Treaty, consists of a set of rules that significantly impact member states' capacities and economic policies. Five of them are particularly important. Firstly, while fiscal policy was essentially national policy, it was, however, restricted to the short term, with budget deficits not to exceed 3% of GDP. Secondly, monetary policy was centralized at the EU level with the European Central Bank (ECB) effectively targeting inflation close to or below 3%. Thirdly, the financial markets were liberalised, and until recently, no-bail out clause prevailed, i.e. neither national government nor the ECB could help a country in financial difficulties. Finally, within the EMU economic policy regime, internal devaluation became the prime mechanism of adjustment to external shocks. Since standard economic tools were paralysed "labour markets are supposed to be flexible. The European Commission and the ECB regard wage flexibility as the cure for economic imbalances. By this they mean downward wage flexibility […] The burden of adjustment has thus to be carried by the labour market and wage policy" (Stockhammer–Köhler 2015, p. 38).

However, preceding the crisis, member states maintained considerable residual sovereignty over the implementation of EMU rules concerning fiscal policies and the extent of labour market liberalisation; they varied considerably across the region, in line with local socio-economic structures, struggles and compromises achieved (Lapavitsas 2012). With the unfolding of the Eurozone crisis, however, the EU adopted a set of legislative packages, known as "new European economic governance", which enabled European policy, to "step by step, tighten[ed] its grip" (Schulten–Müller 2015, p. 332) on national policy areas that were previously confined to the national "negotiation arena".

With respect to the binding character of new policy directives, Schulten and Müller (2015) distinguish two main channels of EU intervention. The country-specific recommendations issued each year since 2010 within European Semester cycles have not been legally binding; nevertheless, following the 2011 Six-Pack provisions, member states can be issued a fine if the "corrective action" is not implemented properly. Secondly, more binding mechanisms concerning the "quid pro quo of reforms for financial support" (Schulten–Müller 2015, p. 337) were laid down between individual countries and the Troika (the EU Commission, the ECB and the IFM).

The tightening of the Euro regime had crucial implications for the policy manoeuvring of member states during the crisis. Fiscal and monetary restrictions limited, if not prevented, the ability to counter the crisis with expansionary fiscal policies, while the separation of fiscal and monetary policy exposed countries to pressures from financial markets (Stockhammer–Köhler 2015). A similar impact was also produced by the EU competition and state aid restrictions that ruled out help to individual industrial enterprises (Myant et al. 2013) and preconditioned the approval for state aid to financial institutions with the restructuring of troubled enterprises, where privatisation was seen as the best possible option (Taškar Beloglavec–Taškar Beloglavec 2014).

Moreover, the "euro-led" restructuring of state apparatuses reshaped the decision-making process. The established mechanisms granted substantial powers to the EU executive and the ECM at the expense of democratically elected bodies, and increased their interference in the macroeconomic policy of member states (Keucheyan–Durand 2015). The new regulations also tended to reconfigure power relations between the EU and a member state, as well as between national apparatuses within individual states (Oberndorfer 2015). The deepening of the European integration in the name of financial stability and the euro unevenly reshaped the capacities of local social and political forces, and their institutional representatives, to impact the local policy-making process. While the executive institutions and those linked to finance were strengthened and accorded the right of policy-making, the institutions defending social rights, protection and equality were weakened and institutionally reduced to "policy-taking" (cf. Keucheyan–Durand 2015, p. 42). "Increasing encroachment on the procedures of formal democracy and the rule of law […] are intended to place the European ensemble of state apparatuses […] of which the national executives are part, in a position to chip away the social rights that are still anchored in the national legal systems" (Oberndorfer 2015, pp. 202–203).

3. Slovenian neo-corporatism before the crisis: Emergence and destabilisation

The particular institutional and macroeconomic trajectory of Slovenian capitalism before the crisis is widely acknowledged, as well as a considerable weakening of the established system after 2004. The following lines argue that these developments are best understood by taking into consideration the (changing) influence of organized labour and the extent of the internationalisation of the Slovenian state.

3.1. Labour pressures and Slovenian neo-corporatist gradualism

Slovenia is widely known for its gradualist approach to macroeconomic stabilisation during the transition and its neo-corporatist regime, which both proved to be rather exceptional in the CEE region (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012, Rojec et al. 2004). Notwithstanding the importance of historical legacies and favourable initial macroeconomic conditions, two factors were particularly important for the peculiar path of Slovenian capitalism: the power of the organized labour and the relatively small degree of internationalisation of the Slovenian state. As a consequence of favourable debt negotiation with the IMF and international lenders after secession, the country was not obliged to seek financial assistance from international creditors (Lindstrom–Piroska 2007).

The establishment of the institutional infrastructure of Slovenian capitalism took place in a period of intense social conflict. In a context of high inflation (approaching 200 percent per year, SORS), real wage increases became unsustainable and were a source of major concern to employers (especially exporters) and the DEMOS government (Crowley–Stanojević 2011, Feldmann 2014). In 1992, when the government decided to freeze wages and suspend collective agreements as unemployment stood at 12% (SORS), the main union federation Zveza svobodnih sindikatov Slovenije organized a massive warning strike that practically paralyzed the country for a few hours, and this evolved into a quite exceptional wave of strikes, which was maintained through the year (Crowley–Stanojević 2011).

Indeed, the strength of organized labour impacted the trajectory of Slovenian capitalism in many ways. Politically, it helped remove the unstable DEMOS coalition from power, resulting in the twelve-year rule of the centre-left government coalition that considered Yugoslav heritage a valuable asset and was consequently reluctant to sell national enterprises to foreign investors (Bandelj 2004, Lindstrom–Piroska 2007, Mencinger 2004). Institutionally, it pushed the government to adopt a method of privatisation in the interests of insiders, while the state became the majority owner of larger, capital-intensive companies. After the strike wave, the government abandoned the wage freeze and accepted the unions' proposal to manage inflation via centralized collective bargaining in the shape of the 1994 Economic and Social council, the main institution of the Slovenian system of social dialogue (Crowley–Stanojević 2011). Finally, Bembič (2013) outlines how organized labour also impacted the policy of the Bank of Slovenia – a fixed exchange rate regime was politically unacceptable, as it would result in direct confrontation with a strong labour movement. According to Lindstrom and Piroska (2007), the Central Bank of Slovenia during the 1990s chose a floating exchange rate in order to protect domestic industries and maintain a low current account deficit, thus acting as a kind of a "social partner" (Greskovits 2009).

This does not imply that the Slovenian government did not try to de-regulate the established system. When, in the second half of the decade, negotiations with the EU started, the government used the accession process as an opportunity to privatise the pension system; at which the unions organized a mass rally with over 20,000 participants in March 1998, repeating the action a year later. The government was forced to reconsider its proposal and to adopt a significantly softer version of the pension system reform (Stanojević 2011). During the 1990s "Slovenia was the most strike-prone country in eastern Central Europe: the volume of strikes (or working days lost per 1,000 employees) in those years was ninety-two in Slovenia, compared to twenty-one elsewhere in Eastern Europe" (Crowley–Stanojević 2011, p. 278).

Thus, the pressures for organised labour and a relatively autonomous policy-making space were the main political factors ensuring "a relatively competitive and simultaneously internally integrated system during the entire period of Slovenia's preparation for membership of the EU and the Eurozone" (Stanojević 2014, p. 104). The country has been widely recognized as being a CEE leader in its drive for capitalist accumulation (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012), and this without undermining social equality and becoming dependent on international investors, either in the banking or corporate sector, as was the case with many other post-socialist countries (see Figure 1 and 2). Finally, the Slovenian state channelled the highest share of its GDP to social protection in the region; while the poverty rate barely increased, from 13.6% in 1993 to 13.8% in 1998, and remained below the EU-18 average of 18% (IMAD 2002).

Figure 1 Net FDI stock, CEE countries, 1997-2007 average, % of GDP



Source: UNCTAD

Figure 2 Market share of foreign-owned banks, Slovenia and Visegrád countries, 2001-2007 average, % of total assets



Source: Raiffeisen CEE Banking Sector Report 2004, 2008, 2014.

3.2. Euro-led rescaling of Slovenian state apparatuses and changing power balance

In 2004/2005 the rescaling of Slovenian state apparatuses in line with the requirements of EU accession and the ERMII regime provoked the first major turning point in the development of Slovenian capitalism, both in terms of its growth model and institutional set-up. The state abolished protectionist measures and control of (financial) capital flows, and lost its exchange rate mechanism (external devaluation) and control over monetary policy (Kržan 2014). The implications of this change for the structural weakening of organized labour were all the more pronounced as the country's entry in the EU coincided with a change in government, bringing a centre-right wing coalition to power. At the beginning of its mandate, the government proposed a package of radical reforms, including a flat tax rate, justifying it with the country's accommodation into the Eurozone. The trade unions organised the largest public protest in the history of the country, joined by around 40,000 workers. The government promptly abandoned the proposed tax reforms but nevertheless succeeded in implementing other measures, though more gradually (Leskošek–Dragoš 2014, Stanojević 2014). The post-2004 restructuring of the state had three important implications for Slovenian industrial relations and the manner of its international integration.

Intensified pressures from international competition and the increasing indebtedness of corporate sector further destabilized the "competitive solidarity" pattern within enterprises. Meanwhile, the growing discontent of workers fuelled interest fragmentation and the radicalisation of trade unions, which now faced collapsing membership. After 2004, the unions lost almost one quarter of their membership, standing at 26% in 2008 (Stanojević et al. 2016). At the same time, after the fixing of the tolar to the euro and the consequent transfer of monetary policy to the European level, the coordination of wage setting and national macroeconomic policy became less important (Feldmann 2014). In fact, in 2006, the government decided to abolish mandatory membership of the main employer organisation; faced with falling membership, their representatives radicalised their stances and increasingly turned towards individual firm-based industrial relations (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012). Following the reforms of labour market, tax system and welfare state, state expenditures on social security decreased by over 3 percentage point to 21.4% of GDP in 2007, and the at-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfer increased by over 2 percentage point to 12.3% between 2004 and 2008 (SI-STAT 2017).

Moreover, the Bank of Slovenia transformed from being a "social" to a "financial" partner. Once the country gained access to the cheap credits that damaged European markets after the euro launch, the loan-to-GDP ratio of domestic banks more than doubled from around 40% of GDP in 2003 to close to 90% in 2008 (OECD 2013) as a result of the explosion of foreign indebtedness in the corporate sector. As Figure 3 shows, up to 2005, the Slovenian economy had assumed the position of a net creditor; but during the following three years, net external debt exploded to represent more than a third of the wealth produced in 2008 (34% of GDP). The credit growth was the most rapid in 2006 and 2007 period, when rising inflation further reduced the real interest rates in Slovenia in comparison to other euro area countries (Bank of Slovenia 2015).

Figure 3 Net external debt, Slovenia, 1995-2012, % of GDP



Source: Eurostat (2017)

Though the growth in credit was the most intense in banks with majority foreign ownership (Bank of Slovenia 2015), domestic banks, which still had predominant market shares at home market, were much more exposed to corporate failure (Kržan 2013).

The changing balance of social power within the Slovenian state apparatuses also manifested itself on the macroeconomic level with a shift in the growth model from export-led industrialisation in favour of domestic capitalists towards a credit-fuelled overheating of the economy, driven by an intense investment activity (Becker–Jäger 2012, Kržan 2014, Ponikvar et al. 2014). Though the largest share of foreign credit was used for erroneous over-investment in core business activities in all sectors of the economy, indebtedness increased most rapidly in cyclical sectors, like construction, real estate and financial holdings. Moreover, cheap credit was also used to finance a new wave of ownership centralisation led by manager-leveraged buy outs (Kržan 2014).

Crucially, the inflows of foreign finance did not lead to any significant technological breakthrough or improved productivity, but instead increased the vulnerability of the Slovenian economy to external shocks (Ponikvar et al. 2014). Rapidly increasing inflation, fuelled by the pre-crisis economic boom, undermined the price competitiveness of the Slovenian economy. In fact, since the mid-2000s, analysists have started to warn about the structural weakness of Slovenian manufacturing, manifested among other things in slower growth of market shares in comparison to benchmark economies (Rojec et al. 2004), but also in the destabilisation of the “competitive solidarity pattern” in enterprises, which used work intensification as its main adjustment to external pressures (Stanojević 2012).

Thus, although the institutional framework of the economy was formally preserved, after 2004 the “Slovenian industrial relations model was already exposed to intensive, significant pressures and changes” (Stanojević et al. 2016, p. 4). As seen now, the crisis only accelerated the underlying pressures: instead of reducing the economic meltdown, a tightened Eurozone regulation not only weakened the Slovenian state's capacities to stabilise economic activity, and exposed the country to pressures from financial markets, but also heightened social tensions over policy measures.

4. The neo-corporatist restructuring following authoritarian and competitive anti-Keynesianism

Slovenia was severely hit during the recent crisis: between 2008 and 2015, the country experienced one of the biggest economic declines of the CEE region, well beyond the EU-19 and the EU-28 average (Eurostat 2017, see also Table 1). Moreover, in contrast to many other states, the initial crisis of the "real economy" evolved into a serious crisis of the banking sector and of sovereign debt. The outbreak of the crisis brought to the forefront of public attention the precariousness of the country's pre-crisis growth, and the necessity of structural changes (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012). However, by promoting an export-led model in favour of foreign investors and exhibiting a strong anti-Keynesian demand management bias, the chosen "anti-crisis" policy program mostly accelerated the rehierarchisation of the Slovenian state apparatuses, following a pattern of "authoritarian competitive statism" (Oberndorfer 2015, p. 185).

4.1. Managing the crisis under an austeritarian regime

For the greater part of the period studied, the political management of the crisis in Slovenia was characterised by the "austeritarian regime" (Lehendorff 2015, p. 11), according to which the austerity measures and structural reforms seeking to reducing labour costs went hand-in-hand with increasingly authoritarian rule. The last quarter of 2008 marked the proper beginning of a crisis in the Slovenian economy, with GDP growth going down by 1.2% (OECD 2015). A decline in foreign demand and the emerging liquidity strain provoked a pronounced contraction in manufacturing and construction. The emergence of the crisis in Slovenia in late 2008 coincided with a change in government, bringing a centre-left coalition to power. Following the European Recovery program, the government initially implemented various fiscal packages that sought to alleviate the shock of a plummeting external demand and financial sources (Tajnikar–Bonča 2015). However, when the country entered the excessive deficit procedure in 2010 and was henceforth under observation within the European Semester cycles, the government performed a strategic U-turn; though the crisis was neither caused nor driven by problems related to fiscal (in)solvency or excessive labour costs (Bole 2012a, Tajnikar–Bonča 2015), the Slovenian government made fiscal consolidation and the improvement of (price) competitiveness the cornerstone of the Slovenian Exit Strategy 2010-2013 (Government of the Republic of Slovenia 2010).

Table 1 Economic performance, Slovenia, selected indicators, 2007-2014, in %

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
GDP growth	6,9	3,3	-7,8	1,2	0,6	-2,7	-1,1	3
Government debt/GDP	22,8	21,8	34,6	38,4	46,6	53,9	71	81
Government deficit/GDP	0,1	1,4	5,9	5,6	6,7	4,1	15	5
Unemployment rate	4,9	4,4	5,9	7,3	8,2	8,9	10,1	9,7
Current account balance/GDP	-4,1	-5,3	-0,6	-0,1	0,2	2,6	4,8	6,2

Source: SI-STAT (2017) and Eurostat (2017)

This "ambitious program of structural reforms" (OECD 2013, p. 11) comprised the introduction of a fiscal rule; the liberalisation of the pension system and privatisation of state-owned enterprises; a decrease in taxes on labour and the reorganisation of the social security system in line with workfare principles, as well as a mini-jobs reform copying the German system (Government of the Republic of Slovenia 2010). The planned fiscal consolidation was not only strongly digressive, privileging higher-income groups while directly affecting the living standards of low and middle income social strata, but was also pro-cyclical: in the context of rapidly expanding unemployment together with domestic banks highly exposed to corporate failure, it would have been more appropriate to favour fiscal expansionary policy instead of expansionary austerity (Bole 2012a, Senjur 2012).

This policy shift took place in a period of intense labour protests. Throughout 2009, a wave of spontaneous strikes progressively intensified, culminating in November 2009 with the staging of a massive rally. After the protest, the government agreed to increase the minimum wage by almost 23%, partially to appease the workers and partially to gain union approval for its planned reforms of the pension system and labour market (Stanojević et al. 2016). However, the negotiations between institutional partners over the pension system and labour market reforms broke down irremediably (Guardiancich 2012), and the government decided to implement both reforms unilaterally (Stanojević 2014).

This move pushed the entire "Keynesian electorate" to the opposition: public sector unions organized the biggest strike in the history of the independent state, involving about 80,000 workers, and joined private sector unions in promoting a massive referendum campaign against legislative changes (Stanojevic–Klaric 2013). The government now called upon the Constitutional Court to assess whether the pension reform was unconstitutional (Feldmann 2014). The Court, however, refused the government's demand, and in spring 2011, both reforms were rejected by the populace and withdrawn from the legislation schedule. Slovenia found itself in a serious political crisis: the government suffered a vote of no-confidence and, for the first time in the history of the independent state, early elections took place, bringing the centre-right coalition back into power in early 2012 (Stanojević et al. 2016).

The change in government coincided with a significant degradation of the Slovenian economy, and this despite the fact that as early as in 2010, improved foreign demand had been leading the Slovenian export manufacture towards recovery (Myant–Drahokoupil 2011): unemployment, standing at 8% in late 2011, had almost doubled since the outbreak of the crisis, the unresolved problems of corporate-banking debt led to a rapid growth in non-performing loans on bank portfolios, standing at over 19% of GDP in 2012 (Kržan 2014, OECD 2013), while the ECB status (see above) and turmoil in the Eurozone had sent Slovenia's costs of borrowing upwards, though public debt remained below Maastricht criteria and fiscal solvency was above the EU average (Bole 2012a, Kržan 2013). The new government now centralised policy decision-making in the finance ministry (Mekina 2012b); the new program combining a foreign-led restructuring of the corporate and banking sectors with drastic austerity measures intended to bring the public deficit from 6.7% to below 3% of GDP in a year (Government of the Republic of Slovenia 2012, p. 23). In addition, by the end of the year the government amended over 100 laws under the 'fast track' costumes procedure (Mekina 2012b).

Meanwhile, the proposed reform package and the authoritarian ruling had sparked anger in the local population. The public trade unions organised another general strike and urged the government to moderate its proposed budgetary cuts (Stanojevic–Klaric 2013). Several calls for a referendum against the proposed measures were made by trade unions and members of opposition groups. Whereas the unions' calls were dismissed by methods on the limits of legality (Dnevnik 2012), the demands of the opposition were reviewed by the Constitutional Court at the request of the government. This time, the Court considered a referendum would be unconstitutional (Pistotnik–Živčič 2015). The Court's decision came at the very peak of the so-called Slovenian "winter of discontent", the biggest civil society movement since the country's independence (Stanojević et al. 2016, p. 5).

During the winter of 2012/2013, a constructive no-vote took place, and a new centre-left coalition was formed. By now, mostly as a result of the "austeritarian" drive, the country found itself "in a typical crisis of fast indebtedness of the government sector and negative economic growth. This has created conditions that have been proper for almost all countries of the European south" (Tajnikar–Došenović Bonča 2015, p. 757, see also Bole 2012b, pp. 7–8). After the Cyprus crisis, when Slovenian government bonds spiked at close to 7% (Eurostat 2017), the international press again speculated whether the country would become "The next domino?" (The Economist 2013) While the third "crisis" government did succeed in sheltering the country from the poisoned chalice of Troika assistance, this was achieved at the expense of social rights and democratic procedures.

By the middle of the year, further cuts in public expenditure and labour market reform had been implemented. The Parliament approved the constitutionalisation of the "golden fiscal rule", restricted referendum legislation, and thus "removed a powerful tool from the trade unions to combat anti-labour proposals" (Stanojević et al. 2016, p. 6), and launched the procedures for the privatisation of state owned enterprises. In June 2013, i.e. during the annual period of revision of national reform programs by EU institutions, the EU Commission and the ECB blocked the governments' action of bank recapitalisation and the transfer of non-performing loans to bad banks, and demanded new stress tests (Breznik–Furlan 2015, Council of the EU 2013).

The operation resulted not only in much higher estimation of the total capital needs of the banks at 10% of GDP, and increased public debt almost half to 71% of GDP; Slovenian authorities also, rapidly and without public debate, modified banking capital legislation and insolvency procedures (Mencinger et al. 2014). As a prerequisite to the approval of state aid, the government committed to fully privatise two, mainly state-owned banks (NKBM and Abanka) after their recapitalisation, and to reduce state ownership in the largest, mainly state-owned bank to 25% plus one share in the medium term (DC ECOFIN 2014, for information on exact state aid decision see Taškar Beloglavec–Taškar Beloglavec 2014).

Losing all legitimacy and credibility, the Bratušek administration resigned in early 2014, less than a year after it had assumed power. By 2014, more than 90% of the population was dissatisfied with the state of democracy, while prior to the crisis, this figure represented half of the population (Krašovec–Johannsen 2016). And while by 2014, the crisis seemed to be pacified, the recovery was mostly driven by exports and heightened dependency on foreign demand. Between 2007 and 2015, the share of exports in GDP increased from 67% to 79%, and investment (measured as fixed capital formation) went down from 30% to 15%, reaching its lowest point since the exit of the Slovenian economy from the "transformation depression" of the early 1990s (SI-STAT 2017). A rather depressed domestic demand was also a major factor behind the stabilisation of the balance-of-payments situation, allowing the country to accumulate unprecedented current account surpluses, standing at a stunning 6.2% of GDP in 2014 (Bole 2016, IMF 2016). At the same time, the country recorded an above EU-average rise in at-risk-of-poverty-rate during the crisis, going up from 12.3% in 2008 to 14.5% in 2015. Among the post-socialist countries from the CEE region, only Hungary recorded a similar expansion in poverty (Eurostat 2017). To a large extent, the deterioration of living standards was related to the adopted structural reforms discussed below.

4.2. Institutional reshuffling in favour of (price) competitiveness

Though both organised labour and the state as the main regulator of Slovenian capitalism had been attacked to an unprecedented extent, the crisis failed to enfeeble either of them, and most resulting reforms were implemented with the agreement of social partners. Instead, the implemented reforms accelerated the already present trend of reshuffling Slovenian institutional infrastructure at the expense of the central role of labour in political and economic management.

In 2010, the reform of the social security system introduced means tested social transfers and subsidies. Social allowances were now attributed on the basis of income as well as property. Social work centres were reorganised and a new electronic system was established in order to ensure a better overview of the property and incomes of applicants for social support. (OECD 2013) The reform changed the Slovenian social security system in line with new welfare principles, meaning that benefits moved from being universal to targeted and conditional (Trbanc et al. 2016). The 2012 pension system reform raised the retirement age for both woman and men to 65 years, or after 40 years of pensionable service, and introduced a restrictive pension indexation policy (IMAD 2016).

By practically lowering the working standards of permanent workers to that of the casual workers, the 2013 labour market reform provoked one of the biggest decreases in the employment security index among OECD countries during the crisis (OECD 2015). Slovenia currently has the biggest share of fixed-term youth contracts in the EU, representing over 80% of all contracts (IMAD 2016). In addition, the reform also introduced a new hierarchy in the system of collective bargaining by allowing more flexible arrangements at the company level. The recent practices have shown that this flexibility is mostly used to lower wage standards and working conditions. (Stanojević et al. 2016)

A cross-sectorial Public Finance Balance Act, adopted in 2012, provided legal grounds for a restrictive fiscal policy (Pistotnik–Živčič 2015). As mentioned, a restrictive fiscal policy gained constitutional grounds in the middle of 2013, when the Parliament agreed to the introduction of the fiscal rule in the Constitution following the recommendations of the European fiscal pact. In 2015, constitutional changes were complemented with a Law on fiscal rule that operationalised the rule and prepared the institutional framework for the establishment of the Fiscal council (IMAD 2016).

The reforms of labour welfare went hand-in-hand with the restructuring of the corporate governance system. In 2013 and 2014 the bad bank and sovereign state holding (SSH) were established and became institutional actors in the privatisation of state assets and selling of troubled enterprises. SSH, which centralises all state assets, resembles those that other post-socialist countries established at the beginning of the 1990s (Mekina 2012a). In May 2013, the Parliament approved a list of enterprises to be privatised that included enterprises from the manufacturing sector and strategic ones, like airports, airlines and the major telecom provider. At the end of the year, as seen above, the state also committed itself to selling two state-owned banks and to reducing state ownership of the biggest national bank. (OECD 2015) The initial privatisation plan was formalised in 2015 with the adoption of the State Asset Management strategy. By April 2015, four companies and one bank were sold to foreign investors. According to the Institute for Macroeconomic Analysis and

Development, the FDI inflows amounted to EUR 1,447 million in 2014 and attained EUR 1,184.8 million between January and October 2015 (IMAD 2016).

Finally, a word on changes in referendum legislation is in order. The constitutional amendments narrowed the scope of the issues that may constitute the object of a referendum, reduced the mechanisms enabling the call for a referendum and restricted the rules over the voting results. Referendums are no longer allowed to be called with respect to laws concerning fiscal issues (like laws on taxes, customs and other obligatory charges, or laws regulating the implementation of the central government budget); emergency measures regarding the security of the state, the ratification of international treaties, as well as laws that protect constitutionality in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Pistotnik–Živčič 2015).

Despite a significant wave of reform, Slovenian neo-corporatist structures, do in fact remain in place and social dialogue has not vanished. However, as Stanojević et al. (2016, p. 12) stress, "within this formal structure, which has been exposed to small, incremental changes, there are clear signs of major changes in power relations as well as in the logic and quality of the industrial relations system". This logic and quality is best described in terms of competitive authoritarianism, where democratic pressures for social expenditures and more equal redistribution of produced wealth are prevented by legal barriers.

5. Conclusion

This contribution discusses the changing role of states in their national economies by focusing on the internationalisation of the Slovenian state and related transformations of Slovenian neo-corporatism. In a context of a comparatively shallow internationalisation of the Slovenian state and a relatively "autonomous" space for policy-making during the period of EU negotiations, the institutional infrastructure of Slovenian capitalism was shaped by strong organised labour that assured that the economic and political management of labour predominated the institutional hierarchy. With the rescaling of Slovenian state regulations in line with the European single market and Eurozone constraints, labour bargaining power and its institutional capacities to impact on policy-making over major macroeconomic decisions started to weaken even prior to the crisis. This trend accelerated in the post-2008 period and its "austeritarian" crisis management. Whereas the local population was pushed into a position of policy acceptance, the decision-making process increasingly took place between leading Slovene financial institutions and executive bodies, and the European Commission together with the ECB. In other words, while the structural weakness of the Slovenian economy and power struggles between various social forces had domestic roots, the Eurozone regime helped to consolidate the external dependency of the Slovenian economy and to weaken the wage-bargaining power of labour.

This discussion contributes to the existing debate on the political economy of Slovene capitalism during the crisis in three ways. Firstly, differences in policy responses have often been explained in terms of the cultural/ideological backgrounds of successive governments (Lindstrom 2015, Myant et al. 2013). According to this analysis, however, the policy agenda and the actual implementation of reform measures were also related to the strength of organised labour and its organisational capacities. Secondly, whereas the importance of external and internal constraints to the post-2008 policy shift has been acknowledged (Bohle–Greskovitz 2012, Stanojević et al. 2016), the "embeddedness" of Slovenian state regulations in the Eurozone regime and the consequent uneven restructuring of the capacities of various local social forces to influence decision-making process have been underestimated. Thirdly, when discussing the institutional transformation of the Slovenian economy in the post 2007/08 period, the analysis should go beyond the dichotomist understanding of institutional change in terms of continuity and change to integrate the question of power relations between social forces and institutions representing them.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the participants at the PhD workshop "European Economic Integration Theory Revisited" (University of Szeged, 23rd-24th March 2017), especially Dóra Piroska and Gábor Dávid Kiss, as well as to peer reviewers for their comments and critics of the earlier version of this paper. Any responsibility for the final outcome is entirely my own.

References

Bandelj, N. (2004): Negotiating global, regional, and national forces: Foreign investment in Slovenia. *East European Politics and Societies*, 18, 3, 1–26.

Bank of Slovenia (2015): *Report of the Bank of Slovenia on the causes of the capital shortfalls of banks*. Ljubljana: Bank of Slovenia.

Becker, J. – Jäger, J. (2012): Integration in crisis: A regulationist perspective on the interaction of European varieties of capitalism. *Competition & Change*, 16, 3, 169–187.

Becker, J. – Jäger, J. – Weissenbacher, R. (2015): Uneven and dependent development in Europe: The crisis and its implications. In Jäger, J. and Springler, E. (eds.): *Asymmetric crisis in Europe and possible futures: Critical political economy and post-Keynesian perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, 81–97.

Bembič, B. (2013): Kolikšna je bojna pripravljenost socialnega partnerja? In Hajdini, S. (ed.): *Prvotna akumulacija med zgodovino in konceptom*. Ljubljana: Inštitut za delavske študije, 83–95.

Bluhm, K. (2010): Theories of capitalism put to the test: Introduction to a debate on Central and Eastern Europe. *Historical Social Research*, 35, 2 (132), 197–217.

Bohle, D. – Greskovits, B. (2007): Neoliberalism, embedded neoliberalism and neocorporatism: Towards transnational capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe. *West European Politics*, 30, 3, 443–466.

Bohle, D. – Greskovitz, B. (2012): *Capitalist diversity on Europe's periphery*. Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Bole, V. (2012a): Ekonomsko-politični videz in stvarnost. *Gospodarska gibanja*, 449, 6–21.

Bole, V. (2012b): Repesaž ekonomske politike. *Gospodarska gibanja*, 444, 6–14.

Bole, V. (2016): "Potencial" potencialnega produkta. *Gospodarska gibanja*, 486, 6–23.

Brenner, N. (1999): Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and geographical scale in globalization studies. *Theory and Society*, 28, 1, 39–78.

Breznik, M. – Furlan, S. (2015): Kje je Slovenija v mednarodni dolžniški krizi? In Breznik, M. – Rastko, M. (eds): *Javni dolg: Kdo komu dolguje*. Ljubljana: Založba, 169–215.

Bruszt, L. – Greskovits, B. (2009): Transnationalization, social integration, and capitalist diversity in the East and the South. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44, 4, 411–434.

Bugaric, B. – Kuhelj, A. (2015): Slovenia in crisis: A tale of unfinished democratization in East-Central Europe. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 48, 4, 273–279.

Cardoso, F. H. (1972): Dependency and development in Latin America. *New Left Review*, 74, 1, 83–95.

Cardoso, F. H. – Faletto, E. (1979): *Dependency and development in Latin America*. California: University of California Press.

Cardoso, F. H. (2009): New paths: reflections about some challenges of globalization. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44, 4, 296–317.

Coates, D. (2014): Studying comparative capitalisms by going left and by going deeper. *Capital & Class*, 38, 1, 18–30.

Council of the EU (2013): *Council recommendation on the national reform program of Slovenia 2013 (C 217/75)*. Brussels: Council of the EU.

Crowley, S. and Stanojević, M. (2011): Varieties of capitalism, power resources, and historical legacies: Explaining the Slovenian exception. *Politics & Society*, 39, 8, 368–285.

DC ECOFIN (2014): *Macroeconomic Imbalances Slovenia 2014*. Occasional Papers 187, DC ECOFIN.

Dnevnik (2012): Sindikat KNG: Kam je izginilo 394 podpisov na poti od DZ do MNZ? https://www.dnevnik.si/slovenija?ved=0CBsQ0gIoATAA&usg=AFQjCNE1iyAoFq_5eHCNSMSgx54gfjRxbQ&ei=cOsNVK3YIsSlO4v7gMgG&sa=U&p=1093 Accessed: 05/11/2012.

EUROSTAT (2017): European Statistics. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ Accessed: November 15, 2017

Feldmann, M. (2014): Coalitions and corporatism: The Slovenian political economy and the crisis. *Government and Opposition*, 49, 1, 70–91.

Frank, A. G. (1966): Development of underdevelopment. *Monthly Review*, 18, 4, 17–31.

Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2010): Slovenian Exit Strategy 2010–2013.

Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2012): National reform program 2012–2013.

Grdešić, M. (2008): Mapping the paths of the Yugoslav model: Labour strength and weakness in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 14, 2, 133–151.

Greskovits, B. (2009): Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia: Banking on identity. In Dyson, K. – Marcussen, M. (eds.): *Central banks in the age of the Euro: Europeanization, convergence, and power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 203–220.

Guardiancich, I. (2012): The uncertain future of Slovenian exceptionalism. *East European Politics & Societies*, 26, 2, 380–399.

Guardiancich, I. (2016): Slovenia: The end of a success story? When a partial reform equilibrium turns bad. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 68, 2, 205–231.

Hardy, J. (2015): Explaining 'varieties of solidarity': Labour mobility and trade unions in an enlarged Europe. *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research*, 21, 2, 187–200.

Hirsch, J. (2013): *Gospostvo, hegemonija in politične alternative*. Translated by Mojca Dobnikar. Ljubljana: Sophia.

Hirsch, J. – Kannankulam, J. (2010): The spaces of capital: The political form of capitalism and the internationalization of the state. *Antipode*, 43, 1, 12–37.

IMAD (2002): *Development Report 2002*. Ljubljana: Institut for Macroeconomic Analysis and Development.

IMAD (2016): *Development Report 2016*. Ljubljana: Institut for Macroeconomic Analysis and Development.

IMF (2016): *Republic of Slovenia*. IMF Country Report No. 16/122. Washington, D.C.

Keucheyan, R. – Durand, C. (2015): Bureaucratic Caesarism. *Historical Materialism: Research in Critical Marxist Theory*, 23, 2, 23–51.

Krašovec, A. – Johannsen, L. (2016): Recent developments in democracy in Slovenia. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 63, 5–6, 313–322.

Kržan, M. (2013): Pregled gospodarske krize v Sloveniji s poudarkom na bančnem sektorju: vzroki, ukrepi, alternative. *Borec: revija za zgodovino, literaturo in antropologijo*, 65, 698/702, 132–160.

Kržan, M. (2014): Crisis in Slovenia: Roots, effects, prospects. *METU Studies in Development*, 41, 3, 323-348.

Lapavitsas, C. (2012): *Crisis in the Eurozone*. London: Verso Books.

Lehendorff, S. (2015): Europe's divisive integration: An overview. In Lehendorff, S. (ed.): *The divisive integration: The triumph of failed ideas in Europe – revisited*. Brussels: ETUI, 7–38.

Leskošek, V. – Dragoš, S. (2014): Social inequality and poverty in Slovenia: Policies and consequences. *Družboslovne razprave*, 30, 76, 39–53.

Lindstrom, N. (2015): Wither diversity of post-socialist welfare capitalist cultures? Crisis and change in Estonia and Slovenia. *European Journal of Sociology*, 56, 1, 119–139.

Lindstrom, N. – Piroska, D. (2007): The politics of privatization and Europeanization in Europe's periphery: Slovenian banks and breweries for sale? *Competition & Change*, 11, 2, 117–135.

Mekina, B. (2012a): Lisica bi pazila na kokoši. Mladina 24, 19/10/2012.

Mekina, B. (2012b): Nazaj v leto 1988. Mladina 47, 23/11/2012.

Mencinger, J. (2004): Transition to a national and a market economy: A gradualist approach. In Mrak, M. – Rojec, M. – Silva-Jáuregui, C. (eds.): *Slovenia: from Yugoslavia to the European Union*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 67–82.

Mencinger, J. – Juuse, E. – Kattel, R. (2014): *Financial regulation in Slovenia*. FESSUD Working Paper Series 58.

Myant, M. – Drahokoupil, J. (2011): *Transition economies: Political economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*. Hoboken: Wiley.

Myant, M. – Drahokoupil, J. – Lesay, I. (2013): The political economy of crisis management in East–Central European countries. *Europe Asia Studies*, 65, 3, 383–410.

Nölke, A. – Vliegenthart, A. (2009): Enlarging the varieties of capitalism: The emergence of dependent market economies in East Central Europe. *World Politics*, 61, 4, 670–702.

Oberndorfer, L. (2015): From new constitutionalism to authoritarian constitutionalism: New economic governance and the state of European democracy. In Jäger, J. and Springler, E. (eds.): *Asymmetric crisis in Europe and possible futures: Critical political economy and post-Keynesian perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, 186–207.

OECD (2013): *Economic Survey: Slovenia*. OECD.

OECD (2015): *Economic Surveys: Slovenia 2015*. OECD.

Panitch, L. – Gindin, S. (2012): *The making of global capitalism*. London and New York: Verso Books.

Pistotnik, A. – Živčič, L. (2015): Impact of international finance and other institutions on key policies of Slovenia. http://www.sinteza.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/07-Pri-re%C5%A1evanju-krize-smo-poslu%C5%A1ali-le-tuje-akterje-%C5%A0TUDIJA-aa.pdf Accessed: November 15, 2017

Ponikvar, N. – Tajnikar, M. – Bonča, P. D. (2014): A small EU country attempting to exit the economic crisis: Rediscovering the post Keynesian perspective on incomes and prices policy. *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, 36, 1, 153–173.

Rojec, M. – Šušteršič, J. – Vasle, B. – Bednaš, M. – Jurančič, S. (2004): The rise and decline of gradualism in Slovenia. *Post-Communist Economies*, 16, 4, 459–482.

Schulten, T. – Müller, T. (2015): European economic governance and its intervention in national wage development and collective bargaining. In Lehndorff, S. (ed.): *Divisive integration: The triumph of failed ideas in Europe — revisited*. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute, 331–364.

Selwyn, B. (2011): Beyond firm-centrism: Re-integrating labour and capitalism into global commodity chain analysis. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 12, 1, 205–226.

Selwyn, B. (2014): *The global development crisis*. Cambridge: Polity.

Senjur, M. (2012): Varčevalni ukrepi v Sloveniji - ekspanzivni ali recesijski? *Bančni vestnik*, 61, 7/8, 24–27.

SI-STAT (2017): Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. http://www.stat.si/statweb Accessed: November 15, 2017

Stanojević, M. (2011): Social pacts in Slovenia: Accomodation to the EMU regime and the post-euro development. *Warsaw Forum of Economic Sociology*, 2, 1(3), 107–135.

Stanojević, M. (2012): The rise and fall of Slovene corporatism: Local and European factors. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 64, 5, 857–877.

Stanojević, M. (2014): Conditions for neoliberal turn: The case of Hungary and Slovenia. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 20, 2, 97–112.

Stanojevic, M. – Klaric, M. (2013): The impact of socio-economic shocks on social dialogue in Slovenia. *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research*, 19, 2, 217–226.

Stanojević, M. – Mrčela, A. K. – Breznik, M. (2016): Slovenia at the crossroads: Increasing dependence on supranational institutions and the weakening of social dialogue. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 22, 3, 281–294.

Stockhammer, E. – Köhler, K. (2015): Linking a Post-Keynesian approach to critical political economy: Debt-driven growth, export-driven growth and the crisis in Europe. In Jäger, J. and Springler, E. (eds.): *Asymmetric crisis in Europe and possible futures. Critical political economy and post-Keynesian perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, 34–49.

Tajnikar, M. – Bonča, P. D. (2015): Razumevanje javnega sektorja in slovenska gospodarska politika po letu 2008. *Teorija in praksa*, 52, 4, 743–758.

Taškar, B. S. – Taškar, B. B. (2014): Sanacija bank – je izvedba prve in druge sanacije vsebinsko primerljiva? *Bančni vestnik: revija za denarništvo in bančništvo*, 63, 9, 39–45.

The Economist (2013): The next domino? 13/04/2013.

Trbanc, M. – Jež, S. S. – Dremelj, P. – Boljka, U. – Lebar, L. – Narat, T. (2016): *Socialni položaj v Sloveniji 2014–2015 (Dopolnjeno končno poročilo)*. Ljubljana: Inštitut Republike Slovenije za socialno varstvo.

UNCTAD (2017): UNCTADStat. http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en Accessed: November 15, 2017